Key insulation is an important technique to protect private keys. To deal with the signing key exposure problem in attribute-based signature systems, we propose an attribute-based threshold key-insulated signature (ABTKIS) scheme. It strengthens the security and flexibility of existing attribute-based key-insulated signature schemes. Our scheme is provably secure in the standard model (i.e. without random oracles).
INTRODUCTION
To protect private keys, Dodis et al. proposed the idea of key insulation in EUROCRYPT 2002 (Dodis,Katz,Xuand Yung, 2002) . The first key-insulated signature scheme was formalized by Dodis et al. in PKC 2003 (Dodis,Katz,Xuand Yung, 2003 . Attribute-Based Signature (ABS) can manifest apretension to the attributes that the underlying signer owns (Li and Kim, 2010; Li, Au, Susilo, Xie and Ren, 2010; Shahandashti and Safavi-Nain,2009 ). ABS can be applied to attribute based messaging systems and anonymous authentication. The first attribute-based key-insulated signature scheme (ABKIS) was proposed by Chen et al. (Chen, Long, Chen and Guo, 2014) . After that, attribute-based parallel key-insulated signature (ABPKIS) schemeswere given for some special situations (Chen, Yu, Long and Chen, 2015) .
To enhance the security and flexibility of the key insulation mechanism, Weng et al. (Weng, Li, Chen and Liu, 2008) put forward the threshold key insulation mechanism in CT-RSA 2008. In this paper, we extend the threshold key-insulated mechanism to the complementary case of digital signatures and put forward an attributebased threshold key-insulated signature (ABTKIS) scheme. In a (k, n) threshold key-insulated ABTKIS system, long-term keys (called helper keys) are kept in physically-secure but computationally-limited devices called helpers. On the other hand, users store short-term signing keys (called temporary signing keys) in a powerful but insecure device where cryptographic computations happen. At least k out of n helpers are needed to update the user's temporary signing keys. The ABTKIS cryptosystem refreshes the temporary private keys at discrete time periods via interaction between the user and the helper, and the public key (attribute set) remains unchanged throughout the lifetime of the system. Our proposed ABTKIS scheme is key-insulated, and even if k-1 helper keys and some of his temporary signing keys are compromised, an adversary is still unable to derive this user's temporary signing keys in other time periods. It is strongly key-insulated, and even if n helper keys and none of his temporary signing keys are exposed, it is still impossible for an adversary to obtain all of this user's temporary signing keys.
PRELIMINARIES
Throughout this paper, we let Z p denote the set {0,1,2,,p-1} and
S means choosing an element x from S with a uniform distribution.
Bilinear Pairings
Our ABTKIS scheme uses a bilinear map (pairing), ê : G 1 ×G 1 →G 2 , where G 1 is a multiplicative group with prime order p and G 2 is also a multiplicative group with prime order p. The pairingsatisfies the following conditions:
•Bilinear: For all g 1 ,g 2 G 1 and for all a,b
•Non-degenerate: There exists g 1 ,g 2 G 1 such that ê (g 1 ,g 2 )≠1.
•Computable: There is an efficient algorithm to computeê (g 1 ,g 2 ) for all g 1 ,g 2 G 1 .
Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumptions
Definition 1. The CDH problem in G 1 is, given g, g a , g b G 1 , to compute g ab (for unknown randomly chosen a,b Definition 2. We say that the (t, )-CDH assumption holds in a group G 1 if no algorithm running in time at most t can solve the CDH problem in G 1 with probability at least.
DEFINITION OF ABTKIS
•Setup (, l, d) : Given a security parameter, the length l of some universe U, of size |U| and a threshold value d, the PKG runs this algorithm to output a master key msk and public parameters cp.
• KeyGen(msk, cp): Given the user's identity U, as a set representing a user's attributes, public parameters cp and the master key msk, the PKG runs this algorithm to output an initial private key TK ,0 and n helper keys HK ,i (1in) that corresponds to .
•HelperUpt (cp, i, t •Sign(cp, t, m, TK ,t ): Given public parameters cp, a period index t, a message m and a temporary private key TK ,t , this algorithm outputs a signature (t,) with regard to the period index t, the attribute set  and message m.
•Verify(cp, m,, (t,)): Given public parameters cp, a message m, an attribute set  and a signature (t,) with regard to period t, an attribute setand message m, this algorithm outputs 1 if (t,) is a valid signature and 0 otherwise.
SECURITY NOTIONS FOR ABTKIS
For convenience, we give the definition of a restricted identity as below: a restricted identity * satisfies   *, where is the challenge identity
Key-insulated Security
The key-insulated security notion captures the intuition that, if an adversary does not compromise the helper key for a given identity (i.e., an attribute set), then exposure of any of the private keys does not enable an adversary to forge a valid signature for the non-exposed time periods.
Formally, for an ABTKIS scheme, its key-insulated security can be defined via the following game of existential unforgeability against a chosen identity and an adaptive chosen message attack under key-exposure (UF-ID&KE-CMA) between an adversary and a challenger : ·Init. The adversary declares the identity, where ||<d and d is the threshold and the time period index t * that he wishes to be challenged upon. ·Setup. The challenger  runs the algorithm Setup and tells the adversary  the public parameters. ·Query Phase. The adversary  adaptively issues a set of queries as below:
Key Generation queries:  first runs the algorithm KeyGen to obtain the initial private key TK ,0 and the helper key , HK i  that corresponds to the identity . It then sends these results to the adversary.
Helper Key queries, i :  runs algorithm KeyGen to generate HK ,i and sends it to the adversary.
Temporary Private Key queries, t:  runs the algorithm UserUpt to obtain the temporary private key for the identity  and period index t. It then sends the result to .
Signing queries, t, m: C runs the algorithm Sign(cp, t, m, TK ,t ) to generate a signature (t, ). Then, C returns (t, ) to . ·Output. Finally,  outputs an identity , a period index t * and a corresponding signature(t * , * ).
In the above game, it is also mandated that the following conditions are simultaneously satisfied:①Verify(cp, (t his temporary signing keys are exposed, it is still impossible for an adversary to obtain all of this user's temporary signing keys.
Formally, for an ABTKIS scheme, its strongly key-insulated security can be defined via the following strongly-UF-ID&KE-CMA game between an adversary  and a challenger : ·Init. The same as a UF-ID&KE-CMA game. ·Setup. The same as a UF-ID&KE-CMA game. ·Query Phase. The adversary  adaptively issues a set of queries such as those given below:
Key Generation queries: The same as a UF-ID&KE-CMA game. 
Anonymity
The An ABTKIS scheme satisfies the anonymity requirement if no adversary  can win the following ANONY-ABTKIS game between A and a challenger  with a non-negligible advantage: · runs the algorithm Setup to generate a master key msk and public parameters cp and sends them to . · can use the master key msk to generate temporary private keys and signatures. · will next submit a challenge period index t * , a message m *, two identities ( 1 ,  2 ) and a challenge identity , where ( 1 ∩ 2 ) and ||d. 
OURPROPOSED ABTKIS

Description of our scheme
We define the Lagrange coefficient
for iZ p and a set S of elements in Z p . The proposed ABTKIS scheme consists of the following algorithms: ·Setup(, l, d): Given a security parameter, the length l of some universe U,of size | U |, and a threshold value d, the PKG works as follows: ①Define the universe U. For simplicity, we can take the first l elements of Z * p to be the universe, specifically, the integers 1, , l (mod p);Choose the total number n of each user's helpers and a threshold value d ; ②Let G 1 and G 2 be two groups with prime order p of size , let g be a generator of 
For convenience, we define two functions L 1 and L 2 such thatL 1 (S 1 )=w
In addition, for a given time period t and a given message m, we hereafter use W t and  m to denote the following sets: 
③ Set the temporary private key for the identity  and period t
④ Delete TK ,t and UI ,t ; ⑤Return TK ,t .
Note that if let
, thenTK ,t is always set to be
  W This can be seen from the following:
Suppose that the signer has a temporary private key for the attribute set  and time period t. In period t, the signer can produce the signature on m with the attribute set   = {i 1 , i 2 , ,i k }, where 1kd, as follows: 
This result can be seen from the following: 
The consistency of this scheme can be explained as follows: 
